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THE NRC REPORT 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CRIMINAL LITIGATION 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
ABSTRACT: The National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS), issued a landmark report on forensic science in February 2009. 
In the long run, the report's recommendations, if adopted, would benefit law enforce-
ment and prosecutors. The recommendations would allow forensic science to develop a 
strong scientific basis and limit evidentiary challenges regarding the reliability of 
forensic evidence. In keeping with its congressional charge, however, the NRC com-
mittee did not directly address admissibility issues. Nevertheless, given its content, the 
report will inevitably be cited in criminal cases. Indeed, within months, the United 
States Supreme Court cited the report, noting that "[s]erious deficiencies have been 
found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials." 1 Defense attorneys would be 
derelict if they did not use it, and prosecutors will have no choice but to respond to 
defense arguments. This essay examines how courts may respond to the NRC report in 
the near future. 
CITATION: Paul C. Giannelli, The NRC Report and Its Implications for Criminal 
Litigation, 50 Jurimetrics J. 53-66 (2009). 
The National Research Council's report2 on forensic science undoubtedly 
will have a profound impact on crime laboratories and the judicial system. The 
report's findings are significant: "Among existing forensic methods, only 
nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to con-
sistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection be-
tween an evidentiary sample and a specific individual or source."3 Although 
commentators4 and some courts had made this point before, such a finding, 
coming from one of the nation's most prestigious scientific organizations, 
carries far more authority. Moreover, the report noted that in some cases faulty 
forensic analyses may have contributed to the wrongful conviction of innocent 
defendants. 5 
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
I. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009). 
2. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. 
3. /d. at l 00. 
4. See generally Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigrnan, Failed Forensics: How Forensic 
Science Lost Its Way And How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 149 (2008); 
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence, 61 V AND. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
5. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 42, 100. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. 
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REv. I (2009); 
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Of course, the extent of the report's impact depends on which of its rec-
ommendations are implemented. Adoption of all recommendations would be 
the most important development in forensic science since the establishment of 
the crime laboratory in the mid-1920s.6 Some recommendations are struc-
tural-that is, the creation of an in-dependent federal entity, the National Insti-
tute of Forensic Sciences (NIFS), to oversee the field7 and the removal of 
crime laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement agen-
cies.8 Other recommendations could be adopted independently of these struc-
tural reforms, as the report acknowledges. 9 For example, legislatures could 
mandate the accreditation of crime laboratories, as a few states have done. 10 
Similarly, recommendations concerning research to determine the reliability of 
forensic evidence11 and the consequences of human observer bias 12 could be 
funded even in the absence of an independent agency. 13 These objectives, 
however, are all long-term goals. This essay focuses on short-term conse-
quences: How courts may respond to the NRC report in the near future. 
I. ADMISSffiiLITY ISSUES 
In keeping with its congressional charge, the NRC committee did not 
directly address admissibility issues. The report states: "No judgment is made 
about past convictions and no view is expressed as to whether courts should 
reassess cases that already have been tried." 14 When the report was released, 
the co-chair of the NRC committee stated: 
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 
86 N.C. L. REv. 163 (2007). 
6. "The oldest forensic laboratory in the United States is that of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, created in 1923 by August Vollmer, a police chief from Berkeley, California." 
RICHARD SAPERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 6 (5th ed. 
I 995). "In I 923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles for a period of one 
year. During that time, a crime laboratory was established at his direction." John I. Thornton, 
Criminalistics-Past, Present, and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA I, 23 (1975). 
7. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, recommendation 1, at 81-82. 
8./d., recommendation 4, at 190-91. 
9. "The remaining recommendations in this report are crucially tied to the creation of NIFS. 
However, each recommendation is a separate, essential piece of the plan to improve the forensic 
science community in the United States. Therefore, even if the creation of NIPS is forestalled, the 
committee vigorously supports the adoption of the core ideas and principles embedded in each of 
the following recommendations." !d. at 20-21. 
10. E.g., N.Y. EXEC. § 995-b (McKinney 2009) (requiring accreditation by the state Forensic 
Science Commission); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (2004) (requiring accreditation by the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLDILAB) 
or the American Board of Forensic Toxicology); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon 
2004) (requiring accreditation by the Department of Public Safety). Texas also created a Forensic 
Science Commission. !d. art. 38.0 l. 
I l. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, recommendation 3, at 190. 
12. !d., recommendation 5, at 191. 
13. The NRC committee, however, found that "the research funding strategies of DOJ have 
not adequately served the broad needs of the forensic science community." !d. at 18. Thus, 
whether the report will trigger a different approach remains problematic. 
14. !d. at 85. The report goes on to state: "The report finds that the existing legal regime-
including the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards 
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I want to make it clear that the committee's report does not mean to offer any 
judgments on any cases in the judicial system. The report does not assess past 
criminal convictions, nor does it speculate about pending or future cases. And 
the report offers no proposals for law reform. That was beyond our charge. 
Each case in the criminal justice system must be decided on the record before 
the court pursuant to the applicable law, controlling precedent, and governing 
rules of evidence. The question whether forensic evidence in a particular case 
is admissible under applicable law is not coterminous with the question 
whether there are studies confirming the scientific validity and reliability of a 
forensic science discipline. 15 
Nevertheless, given its content, the report will inevitably be cited in cases. 
Defense attorneys would be derelict if they did not use it, and prosecutors will 
have no choice but to respond to defense arguments. Indeed, within months, 
the United States Supreme Court was citing the report, noting that "[s]erious 
deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal tri-
als."16 
It remains to be seen, however, how much impact the report will have and 
how soon that influence will be felt. Prior to the report, the courts had been 
extremely reluctant to scrutinize closely many forensic techniques, such as 
fingerprint examinations, 17 firearms (ballistics) identifications, 18 and handwrit-
ing comparisons. 19 The report acknowledged that "some courts appear to be 
loath to insist on [empirical] research as a condition of admitting forensic 
science evidence in criminal cases, perhaps because to do so would likely 
'demand more by way of validation than the disciplines can presently of-
fer. "'20 Indeed, commentators had noted21 and studies had confirmed the exis-
governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and 
judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate 
forensic evidence-is inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science 
disciplines." Id. 
15. The Honorable Harry T. Edwards, Co-Chair, Forensic Sci. Comm., Opening Statement at 
the Release of the NRC Report (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/OS 
Edwards. pdf. 
16. Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2527,2537 (2009). 
17. "Overall, what is most striking about the judicial response to the challenges to finger-
printing is a general reluctance to admit that assessing fingerprinting under Daubert raises tricky 
issues." Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 13, 66 (2001). See also Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic 
Science (Especially Fingerpn"nt Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1173-76 
(2003) (discussing the reversal of the burden of persuasion as one of several judicial responses 
employed to avoid confronting the lack of empirical testing). 
18. See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of 
Fireanns and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
19. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification 
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REv. 1723, 1844 (2001); D. 
Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets 
Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 65 (1996). 
20. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting Joan Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert 
Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, 26 CHAMPION 20, 21 (Sept.-
Oct. 2002)). 
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tence of a double standard, under which federal courts apply a more stringent 
admissibility standard in civil cases than in criminal cases.22 The report recog-
nized this development as well, noting that "the appellate courts appear to be 
more willing to second-guess trial court judgments on the admissibility of 
purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases."23 
Yet, a few judges have been willing to tackle the issue. For example, 
dissenting in a fingerprint and handwriting comparison case, Judge Michael 
argued that "[t]he government has .had ten years to comply with Daubert. It 
should not be given a pass in this case."24 Similarly, in a cartridge identifica-
tion case, Judge Gertner admonished her peers: "The more courts admit this 
type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency test-
ing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we 
should require more."25 Significantly, some courts viewed the Supreme 
Court's Daubert trilogl6 as "inviting a reexamination even of 'generally ac-
21. "(T]he heightened standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil 
cases has continued to expand, but ... expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has 
been largely insulated from any change in pre-Dauben standards or approach." D. Michael 
Risinger, Navigating Expen Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Cenaillty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99, 149 (2000). 
22. Compare Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 364 (2002) 
(stating that "the Dauben decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at 
either the trial or the appellate court levels"), with LLOYD DIXON & BRJAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT 
DECISION 25 (200 l) (stating that "since Daub en, judges have examined the reliability of expert 
evidence more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result"). See also Margaret 
A. Berger, Upsetting the Baiance Between Adverse !me rests: The Impact of the Supreme Court"s 
Trilogy on Expe11 Testimony in Toxic Ton Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 
(200 l) ("The Federal Judicial Center conducted surveys in 1991 and 1998 asking federal judges 
and attorneys about expert testimony. In the 1991 survey, seventy-five percent of the judges 
reported admitting all proffered expert testimony. By 1998, only fifty-nine percent indicated that 
they admitted all proffered expert testimony without limitation. Furthermore, sixty-five percent of 
plaintiff and defendant counsel stated that judges are less likely to admit some types of expert 
testimony since Daubert."). 
23. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. 
24. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
25. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005). In United States v. 
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), Judge Pollak ruled that fingerprint experts 
would not be permitted to testify that two sets of prints "matched"-that is, a positive identifica-
tion to the exclusion of all other persons. !d. at 552. This was the first time in nearly 100 years that 
such a decision had been rendered. On rehearing, however, Judge Pollak reversed himself, and 
later cases would continue to uphold the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. !d. at 576. See also 
D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprillting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINN!PlAC L. 
REv. 1073, 1073 (2003) ("The ruling sent shock waves through the community of fingerprint 
analysts, the FBI, and the Department of Justice."). 
26. The Supreme Court revolutionized the standards for admitting expert testimony in 
Dauben v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which was followed by Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kwnho Tire Co. v. CamJichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
Daubert has been transformed over time. In Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the 
Supreme Court referred to Daubert as imposing "exacting standards of reliability." !d. at 455. 
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cepted' venerable, technical fields."27 Moreover, the Second Circuit has writ-
ten that the Supreme Court did not '"grandfather' or protect from Daubert 
scrutiny evidence that had previously been admitted under F1ye,"28 the previ-
ous test for admitting scientific evidence in federal court.29 The report will 
provide support for those judges willing to grapple with the issue and ammu-
nition for defense attorneys who talce their responsibilities seriously. Possible 
developments are discussed below. 
II. EXAGGERATIONS 
Several common types of testimonial assertions should now be unaccept-
able at trial. The NRC report criticized "exaggerated"30 testimony, such as 
claims of perfect accuracy, infallibility, or a zero error rate. 
A. Claims of Zero Error Rate 
In United States v. Havvard, 31 which involved a Daubert challenge to 
fingerprint evidence, the expert claimed "the enor rate for the method is 
zero."32 Note the word method in the above quotation. Examiners argued that, 
while individual examiners may make mistakes, the method itself is perfect. 
However, the dichotomy between "methodological" and "human" error rates 
in this context is "practically meaningless"33 because the examiner is the 
method.34 
27. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwiiting compaiison). 
See also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) ("Courts are now 
confronting challenges to testimony ... whose admissibility had long been settled."). 
28. United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 162 (2d Cir. 2007). 
29. At the time Daube11 was decided, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), 
was the leading case on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Under Frye, the admissibility of 
expert testimony depended on its "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 
!d. at 1014. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye 
v. United States, a Half-Century Inter, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980) (criticizing F1ye). 
30. "[l]mprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes contributed to the admis-
sion of erroneous or misleading evidence." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
31. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D.lnd. 2000), aff'd, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). 
32. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
33. Mnookin, supra note 17, at60. Professor Mnookin goes on to provide this analogy: "The 
same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable form of evidence. 
People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of 
eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently make errors." !d. 
See also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounfing for Error in Intent Fingerprillt 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1040 (2005) ("in fingerprint practice the 
concept is vacuous"). Professor Cole identified twenty-two misidentifications, which he argues 
"are most likely only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of actual cases of fingerprint misattribution." 
!d. at 991. The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) verification by one or more 
other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the International Association of Identification, (3) 
procedures using a sixteen-point standard, and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifi-
cations made by prosecution experts. See id. at 1001-17. 
34. See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerp1int Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 143, 172 (2005) ("But, 
given its unavoidable subjective component, in latent print examination people are the process."). 
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The NRC report addressed this point: "Although there is limited informa-
tion about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses, claims that 
these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible."35 Further-
more, there already is judicial support for this position. For example, in United 
States v. Mitchell,36 the Third Circuit commented: "Testimony at the Daubert 
hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint examiners insist that there is no 
error rate associated with their activities .... This would be out-of-place under 
Rule 702 [which governs expert testimony]."37 
B. Claims of One Hundred Percent Accuracy 
In a firearms identification case, United States v. Monteiro,38 the court 
noted that "the examiners testified to the effect that they could be 100 percent 
sure of a match. Because an examiner's bottom line opinion as to an identifi-
cation is largely a subjective one, there is no reliable statistical or scientific 
methodology which will currently permit the expert to testify that it is a 
'match' to an absolute certainty, or to an arbitrary degree of statistical cer-
tainty."39 The report concurred: "The insistence by some forensic practitioners 
that their disciplines employ methodologies that have perfect accuracy and 
produce no errors has hampered efforts to evaluate the usefulness of the foren-
sic science disciplines."40 
C. Scientific? 
The use of terms such as science or scientific in presenting expert testi-
mony may also be problematic. In 1995, a federal district court in United 
States v. Starzecpyzez41 concluded that "forensic document examination, de-
spite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and other 
trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific ... 
knowledge."'42 The court further stated "that while scientific principles may 
relate to aspects of handwriting analysis, they have little or nothing to do with 
the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic Document Examiners (FDEs)] 
.... [T]his attenuated relationship does not transform the FDE into a scien-
tist. "43 
35. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 142. "Some in the latent print community argue that the 
method itself, if followed correctly ... has a zero error rate. Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic 
.... The method, and the performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both 
involve multiple sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in 
human judgment)." !d. at 143. 
36. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
37. !d. at 246. 
38. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006). 
39. !d. at 372. 
40. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 47. 
41. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
42. !d. at 1038 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
43. !d. at 1041. 
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Although the court went on to admit the testimony as technical evidence, 
it placed conditions on its admissibility.44 Because FDEs use terms such as 
"laboratory" and refer to authorities with titles containing the words "science" 
or "scientific," there is a risk, according to the court, that jurors may bestow 
upon FDEs the aura of the infallibility of science.45 Consequently, these terms 
should not be used in the expert's testimony. Moreover, the court approved a 
jury instruction, which stated "that FDEs offer practical, rather than scientific 
expertise."46 Similarly, in United States v. Glynn,47 a firearms identification 
case, the court ruled: "Based on the Daubert hearings this Court conducted ... 
the Court very quickly concluded that whatever else ballistics identification 
analysis could be called, it could not fairly be called 'science. "'48 
The NRC report also supports this position: "The law's greatest dilemma 
in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence . . . concerns the question of 
whether-and to what extent-there is science in any given forensic science 
discipline."49 A subsequent passage concludes: "Much forensic evidence-
including, for example, bite marks and firearm and toolmark identifications-
is introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation, 
determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the 
discipline. "50 
D. Claims of to the Exclusion of All Others 
Experts frequently testify that they have made a match "'to the exclusion 
of all other firearms. "'51 In United States v. Green,52 the court questioned such 
testimony: "O'Shea [the expert] declared that this match could be made 'to the 
exclusion of every other firearm in the world.' ... That conclusion, needless to 
say, is extraordinary, particularly given O'Shea's data and methods."53 Fur-
ther, in 2008, a year before the NRC report on forensic science was issued, a 
different NRC report, one on computerized ballistic imaging, addressed this 
issue. The 2008 NRC ballistic imaging report cautioned: "Conclusions drawn 
in fireanns identification should not be made to imply the presence of a finn 
44. In the court's view, Daube11 did not apply to nonscientific experts. !d. at 1041-42. The 
court relied on the following statement in Daubert: "Our discussion is limited to the scientific 
context because that is the natore of the expertise offered here." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharrns., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 578, 590 n.8 (1993). This position was undercut by Kwnho Tire, which held that all 
expert testimony must pass the Daube11 reliability test. Kumho Tire Co. v. Cannichael, 526 U.S. 
137, 149 (1999). 
45. Starzecpyze/, 880 F. Supp. at 1029. 
46. !d. at 1049. 
47. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
48. !d. at 570. 
49. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
50. !d. at 107-08. 
51. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMwiNKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
14.01, at 706 n.1 (4th ed. 2007) (citing FBI HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 57 (rev. ed. 1994)). 
52. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
53. !d. at 107 (citations omitted). 
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statistical basis when none has been denwnstrated." 54 In particular, the NRC 
ballistic imaging report was concerned about testimony cast "in bold abso-
lutes," such as that a match can be made to the exclusion of all other firearms 
in the world: "Such comments cloak an inherently subjective assessment of a 
match with an extreme probability statement that has no firm grounding and 
unrealistically implies an error rate of zero."55 
E. Claims of Reasonable Scientific Certainty 
The expression reasonable scientific certainty, which is often included 
(and sometimes demanded) in expert testimony, is another phrase that should 
come under attack. The phrase, which combines two suspect words-scientific 
and certainty-has no scientific meaning. Although it is used frequently in 
cases, its legal meaning is ambiguous at best. Sometimes it is used in lieu of a 
confidence statement-that is, "I am confident of my opinion."-in which 
-case the expert could avoid the term altogether and directly testify how confi-
dent she is in her opinion. 56 
In other cases, courts have interpreted the phrase to mean that the expert 
must testify that a sample probably came from the defendant and not that it 
possibly came from him. In State v. Holt,57 for instance, the expert testified, 
based on neutron activation analysis, that two hair samples were "similar and 
... likely to be from the same source."58 The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that 
expert testimony is admissible only if the opinion is based upon reasonable 
scientific certainty. 59 For that court, reasonable scientific certainty meant that 
the expert had to testify that the hair sample probably came from the defendant 
and not that it possibly came from him.60 
54. COMM. TO ASSESS THE FEASffiiLITY, ACCURACY, AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF A 
NAT'L BALLISTIC DATABASE ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., 
BALLISTIC IMAGING 82 (2008) [hereinafter NRC BALLISTIC IMAGING]. 
55. !d. 
56. "[T]here is nevertheless an undercurrent that the expert in federal court express some 
basis for both the confidence with which his conclusion is formed, and the probability that his 
conclusion is accurate." James E. Hullverson, Jr., Reasonable Degree of Medical Certainty: A 
Tort eta Travers, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 577, 582 (1987). "Many courts continue to exclude opin-
ions which fall short of expressing a probability or certainty ___ . These opinions have even been 
excluded in jurisdictions which have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence." Edward J_ 
Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an Accused's Constitutional Right to 
Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science Evidence: The Antidote 
for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 69 
(1991). 
57_ 246 N.E.2d 365 (Ohio 1969). 
58. !d. at 368 (emphasis added). 
59. Id. 
60. The requirement that experts testify in terms of probability may have originated as a 
"sufficiency" rule in civil cases in which causation was an issue. Generally, expert testimony 
concerning causation (more probable than not) is required to avoid a directed verdict. This suffi-
ciency rule may then have been improperly converted into an "admissibility" rule in civil cases 
and then improperly transplanted into criminal cases. See l PAUL C. GIANNELLI & BARBARA 
ROOK SNYDER, BALDWIN'S OHIO PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 702.6 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the 
Ohio experience with the term). 
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Holt is wrong. Experts frequently testify that two samples "could have 
come from the same source" or "were likely to be from the same source."61 
Such testimony meets the relevancy standard of Federal Rule 40 I, and there is 
no requirement in the Federal Rules of Evidence that an expert's opinion be 
expressed in terms of "probabilities." Thus, in United States v. Cyphers,62 the 
expert testified that hair samples found on items used in a robbery "could have 
come" from the defendants. 63 The defendants argued that the testimony was 
inadmissible because the expert did not express his opinion in terms of "rea-
sonable scientific certainty." The court responded: "There is no such require-
ment."64 
In United States v. Glynn,65 the court ruled tl1at the term reasonable scien-
tific certainty could not be used in a firearms identification case. 66 In light of 
the expert's admission concerning the subjective nature of the examination, 
"the Government did not seriously contest the Court's conclusions that ballis-
tics lacked the rigor of science and that, whatever else it might be, its method-
ology was too subjective to permit opinions to be stated to 'a reasonable 
degree of ballistic certainty. "'67 
ill. LIMITATIONS ON SCOPE OF TESTIMONY 
The NRC report should buttress defense efforts to limit the scope of hand-
writing testimony, permitting expert testimony about the similarities and dis-
similarities between exemplars, but not the specific conclusion that the 
defendant was tl1e author, sometimes referred to as a "common authorship" 
opinion.68 Although the courts have used this approach most frequently in 
61. See, e.g., People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228, 236 (Cal. 2004) (expert "opined that both 
bullets and the casing could have been fired from the same gun ... because of their condition he 
could not say for sure"); Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1997) (expert 
"testified only that the bullets which killed the victim could have been fired from Luttrell's gun"); 
State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 539-40 (N.C. 1982); Commonwealth v. Moore, 340 A.2d 447, 
451 (Pa. 1975). 
62. 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977). 
63. /d. at 1072. See also United States v. Davis, 44 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Evidence 
was also adrrritted that appellant owned sneakers which 'could have' made these prints."). 
64. Cyphers, 553 F.2d at 1072. See also State v. Boyer, 406 So. 2d 143, 148 (La. 1981) 
(reasonable scientific certainty not required where expert testifies concerning the presence of 
gunshot residue based on neutron activation analysis). 
65. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
66./d. at 574--75. 
67./d. at 571. 
68. "Many other district courts have sirrrilarly· perrrritted a handwriting expert to analyze a 
writing sample for the jury without perrrritting the expert to offer an opinion on the ultimate ques-
tion of authorship." United States v. Oskowitz, 294 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). "[1]he 
Court concludes that FDE Rauscher's testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702 to the extent 
that he lirrrits his testimony to identifying and explaining the sirrrilarities and dissirrrilarities be-
tween the known exemplars and the questioned documents. FDE Rauscher is precluded from 
rendering any ultimate conclusions on authorship of the questioned documents and is sirrrilarly 
precluded from testifying to the degree of confidence or certainty on which his opinions are 
based." United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000). See also United 
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999) (expert testimony concerning the 
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questioned document cases, they have sometimes applied it to other types of 
forensic expertise such as firearms examinations. 69 Another court took a less 
restrictive approach, ruling that the expert would be permitted to testify only 
that it was "more likely than not" that recovered bullets and cartridge cases 
came from a particular weapon.70 Either of these approaches could be ex-
tended to other techniques, such as fingerprint comparisons. 
IV. UNUSUAL AND NEW TECHNIQUES 
Any new technique or extension of an older procedure is a good candidate 
for challenge. For example, in Commonwealth v. Patterson,71 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that, although the traditional fingerprint 
method was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, the same 
was not demonstrated in the record when that methodology was applied to 
simultaneous impressions.72 Simultaneous impressions "are two or more fric-
tion ridge impressions from the fingers and/or palm of one hand that are de-
termined to have been deposited at the same time."73 The key, of course, is 
determining whether the impressions were left at the same time and thus came 
from the same person, rather than having been left by two different people at 
different times. 74 The court remanded the case to the trial court. 
Several toolmark cases are also illustrative. Although most courts have 
admitted toolmark evidence, the Florida Supreme Court, in Ramirez v. State,15 
rejected the testimony of five experts who claimed general acceptance for a 
process of matching a knife with a cartilage wound in a murder victim-a type 
general similarities and differences between a defendant's handwriting exemplar and a stick up 
note was admissible, but not the specific conclusion that the defendant was the author). 
69. See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005). In response, 
prosecutors could use demonstrative exhibits, such as in the Lindbergh kidnapping trial. For 
illustrations of the handwriting charts in the Lindbergh case, see ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 370-72 (5th ed. 2007). 
70. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 575. 
71. 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005). 
72. ld. at 24, 29-30. 
73. Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a 
Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, FORENSIC Sci. COMM., Jan. 
2006, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/researchl2006_0l_research02.htm. An FBI 
review addressed this subject: "[I]f an item could only be held in a certain manner, then the only 
way of explaining the evidence is that the multiple prints are from the single person. In some 
cases, identifying simultaneous prints may infer, for example, the manner in which a knife was 
held." ld. However, this review found that there was not even agreement on what constitutes a "si-
multaneous impression," and therefore more explicit guidelines were needed. ld. 
74. "[T]he examiner apparently may take into account the distance separating the latent 
impressions, the orientation of the impressions, the pressure used to make the impression, and any 
other facts the examiner deems relevant. The record does not, however, indicate that there is any 
approved standardized method for making the determination that two or more print impressions 
have been made simultaneously." Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 18. 
75. 810 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2001). Although the court applied Frye, it emphasized the lack of 
testing, the paucity of "meaningful peer review," the absence of a quantified error rate, and the 
lack of developed objective standards-that is, the Daubert factors. ld. at 849-52. 
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of "tool mark" comparison.76 In Sexton v. State,77 an expert testified that car-
tridge cases from unfired bullets found in the appellant's apartment had dis-
tinct marks that matched fired cartridge cases found at the scene of the 
offense.78 The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals ruled the testimony inadmissi-
ble: "This record qualifies Crumley as a firearms identification expert, but 
does not support his capacity to identify cartridge cases on the basis of maga-
zine marks only."79 
V. LACK OF STANDARDS 
The NRC report found the lack of standards in examining evidence to be 
troublesome: "Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic prac-
tice in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place (e.g., [Scien-
tific Working Group] standards), they often are vague and not enforced in any 
meaningful way."80 In another section, the report noted that some disciplines 
"need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective interpretations 
and pursue equally rigorous research and evaluation programs."81 
Experts in some cartridge identification cases failed to follow any proto-
col. In Monteiro, the expert did not malce any sketches or take any photo-
graphs.82 Thus, adequate documentation was lacking. As a result, the court 
wrote: "Until the basis for the identification is described in such a way that the 
procedure performed by [the examiner] is reproducible and verifiable, it is 
inadmissible under Rule 702."83 In Green, the court noted that, although the 
expert had seven years of experience in the field, he was not certified, and his 
laboratory was not accredited.84 Moreover, he had never formally been tested 
by a neutral proficiency examination. 85 "And although he relied on his past 
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his 
past observations."86 
76. !d. at 852. 
77.93 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
78. !d. at 98. 
79. "[T]he magazine or magazines that made the marks upon which Crumley based his 
identification were not found by the police. Therefore Crumley was not able to make test marks 
for comparison. Also, Crumley did not say whether he was familiar with the manufacturing proc-
ess of the magazine or magazines that he said left identifiable marks on the Jive rounds and car-
tridge cases." !d. at 101. 
80. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
81. !d. at 8. 
82. United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006). 
83. !d. 
84. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005). 
85. !d. 
86. !d. 
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VI. EVIDENTIARY RULES 
Two evidentiary rules may play a role in admitting some of the NRC 
report's findings into criminal trials: the learned treatise hearsay exception and 
the judicial notice doctrine. 
A. Learned Treatise Exception 
Learned treatises were admissible at common law but only for the im-
peachment of experts. 87 Federal Evidence Rule 803(18) changed this result, 
making the treatise admissible as substantive evidence by recognizing a hear-
say exception for such texts. 88 According to the federal drafters, "the hearsay 
objection must be regarded as unimpressive when directed against treatises 
since a high standard of accuracy is engendered by various factors: the treatise 
is written primarily and impartially for professionals, subject to scrutiny and 
exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake."89 
The rule refers to "published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets," includ-
ing those on "science" if "established as a reliable authority by the testimony 
or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial no-
tice."90 One would assume that a report prepared by one of the foremost scien-
tific institutions in the nation, at the direction of Congress, after more than a 
two year study, would qualify as reliable.91 If so, the prosecution expert could 
be required to read selected passages from the report during cross-
examination. 92 
B. Judicial Notice 
Federal Evidence Rule 201 (b) provides that a court may judicially notice 
an adjudicative fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accu-
87. Some jurisdictions still follow the traditional rule. E.g .. MICH. R. EVID. 707 (treatises 
"admissible for impeachment purposes only"). See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI, 
UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE§ 33.16 (3d ed. 2009). 
88. Two limitations appear in the rule. First, a treatise may be used substantively only when 
an expert is on the stand. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). This requirement provides an important safe-
guard because it ensures that a knowledgeable person is available "to explain and assist in the 
application of the treatise .... " ld. (Advisory Committee's Note, exception (18)). Second, the 
treatise may be read to the jury but not received as an exhibit, thus precluding its misuse in the 
jury room. Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1414 (lOth Cir. 1990) (noting that permitting a 
treatise in the jury room raises the danger that jurors will be unduly impressed by the treatise). 
89. FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (Advisory Committee's Note, exception (18)). 
90. ld. 
91. The NRC committee, which was established in the fall of 2006, met eight times. "During 
these meetings, the committee heard expert testimony and deliberated over the information it 
heard and received. Between meetings, committee members reviewed numerous published materi-
als, studies, and reports related to the forensic science disciplines, engaged in independent research 
on the subject, and worked on drafts of the final report." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
92. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). The rule of completeness may permit the prosecutor to have other 
passages of the report read to the jury at the same time. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
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racy cannot reasonably be questioned."93 As the Supreme Court has noted: 
"[T]heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of sci-
entific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judi-
cial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201."94 
Once a scientific principle is sufficiently established, a court may take 
judicial notice of the validity of that principle. The principles underlying many 
forensic techniques, including radar, intoxication tests, fingerprints, palm 
prints, firearms identification, handwriting comparisons, DNA profiling, 
blood-spatter evidence, as well as other procedures have all been judicially 
recognized in this fashion.95 But judicial notice is not so limited. The 1992 
National Academy of Sciences report listed a number of facts concerning 
DNA that could be judicially noticed.96 There are numerous passages in the 
recent NRC report that are comparable. Statements about the subjectivity of 
many forensic techniques97 and the lack of empirical testing come to mind. 
-----~-----
In the long run, the NRC recommendations, if adopted, would benefit law 
enforcement and prosecutors. The recommendations would allow forensic 
science to develop a strong scientific basis and limit evidentiary challenges 
regarding the reliability of forensic evidence. At the moment, however, courts 
will confront serious challenges. Even if forensic testimony is limited, stan-
dards are followed, and findings in particular cases are documented, the un-
derlying problem remains-that is, lack of research.98 The report concluded 
93. FED. R. EVID. 20!(b). See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 
ch. 44 (3d ed. 2009). 
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.ll (1993). 
95. See I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. lMWINKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE§ 
1.02, at 3-5 nn.I0-23 (4th ed. 2007) (listing cases). 
96. The report slated: 
The study of DNA polymorphisms can, in principle, provide a reliable method for comparing 
samples. 
Each person's DNA is unique (except that of identical twins), although the actual 
discriminatory power of any particular DNA test will depend on the sites of DNA variation 
examined. 
The current laboratory procedure [RFLP] for detecting DNA variation (specifically, single-
locus probes analyzed on Southern blots without evidence of band shifting) is fundamentally 
sound, although the validity of any particular implementation of the basic procedure will de-
pend on proper characterization of the reproductibilily of the system (e.g., measurement 
variation) and the inclusion of all necessary scientific controls. 
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH CoUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., 
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 149 (1992). 
97. "But even with more training and experience using newer techniques, the decision of the 
toolmark examiner remains a subjective decision based on unarticulated standards and no statisti-
cal foundation for estimation of error rates." NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 153-54. 
98. This underlying problem is noted in the Summary section of the NRC report: 
Some of the forensic science disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial DNA 
analysis, toxicology and drug analysis); others are based on expert interpretation of observed pat-
terns (e.g., fingerprints, writing samples, toolrnarks, bite marks, and specimens such as hair) .... 
There are also sharp distinctions between forensic practitioners who have been trained in chemistry, 
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that "some forensic science disciplines are supported by little rigorous system-
atic research to validate the discipline's basic premises and techniques. There 
is no evident reason why such research cannot be conducted."99 In a later pas-
sage, the report returned to this point: "[N]o forensic method other than nu-
clear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about 
'individualization' (more commonly known as 'matching' of an unknown item 
of evidence to a specific known source). " 100 In particular, the report recog-
nized deficiencies in many common forensic techniques. For example, the 
report made the following observation about firearms identification: "Because 
not enough is known about the variabilities among individual tools and guns, 
we are not able to specify how many points of similarity are necessary for a 
given level of confidence in the result." 101 Further, "[t]he scientific basis for 
handwriting comparisons needs to be strengthened." 102 Similarly, "[t]here is no 
science on the reproducibility of the different methods of [bite-mark] analysis 
that lead to conclusions about the probability of a match." 103 
This state of affairs presents courts with an immediate challenge. As the 
report comments: "[T]here are serious issues regarding the capacity and qual-
ity of the current forensic science system; yet, the courts continue to rely on 
forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the limitations 
of different forensic science disciplines." 104 
biochemistry, biology, and medicine (and who bring these disciplines to bear in their work) and 
technicians who lend support to forensic science enterprises. 
NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. 
99. !d. at 22. In addressing the lack of funding, the report commented: "Of the various facets 
of underresourcing, the committee is most concerned about the knowledge base. Adding more 
dollars and people to the enterprise might reduce case backlogs, but it will not address fundamen-
tallimitations in the capabilities of forensic science disciplines to discern valid information from 
crime scene evidence." Id. at 15. Similar statements are found elsewhere in the report. "A body of 
research is required to establish the limits and measures of performance and to address the impact 
of sources of variability and potential bias. Such research is sorely needed, but it seems to be 
lacking in most of the forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of matching charac-
teristics. These disciplines need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective interpreta-
tions and pursue equally rigorous research and evaluation programs." !d. at 8. 
100. !d. at 87. 
101. !d. at 154. "The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproduci-
bility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated." NRC BALLISTIC 
IMAGING, supra note 54, at 81. 
102. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 166. 
103. "No thorough study has been conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness 
of bite marks; theoretical studies promoting the uniqueness theory include more teeth than are seen 
in most bite marks submitted for comparison. There is no central repository of bite marks and 
patterns." !d. at 174. 
104. !d. at 85. 
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